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Notes
SUBJECT MATrER JURISDICTION, STANDING, AND
CITIZEN SUITS: THE EFFECT OF GWALTNEY OF
SMITHFIELD V. CHESAPEAKE BAY
FOUNDATION, INC.
In Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.I the
Supreme Court held that language of the Clean Water Act2 allowing
citizen suits against persons "alleged to be in violation" does not
permit citizen suits for wholly past violations.' The Court's holding
is very narrow, and it does not by itself dramatically alter the nature
of citizen suits. Dicta in the opinions of the Court and of the con-
curring Justices, however, suggest possible interpretations which
could severely undercut the deterrent effect of citizen suits.4 Be-
1. 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
2. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West
1986 & Supp. 1988)), known as the Clean Water Act, substantially altered the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). The original FWPCA, enacted in 1948, pro-
moted research concerning water pollution and authorized the states to control water
pollution. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AnMIN. NEWS 3668, 3669. Congress amended the FWPCA in 1965 to require the states
to establish water quality standards, and to establish the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Administration, a federal administrative agency with no enforcement powers. Water
Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965). In contrast, the 1972
Clean Water Act prohibits discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters except in
conformance with the Act and with effluent standards and limitations issued by the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West
1986 & Supp. 1988). The Clean Water Act granted the Administrator significant en-
forcement power, including authority to commence civil and criminal actions against
polluters. Id. § 1319 (note that the 1987 amendments significantly expanded the Ad-
ministrator's enforcement power).
3. 108 S. Ct. at 384-85.
4. The language "alleged to be in violation" is also the basis for citizen suits under
the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 20, 90 Stat. 2041 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986)), the Endangered Species Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 1i, 87 Stat. 897 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(1982)), the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 520, 91
Stat. 503 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982)), the Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No.
93-523, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1690 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1982)), the
Noise Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-574, § 12, 86 Stat. 1243 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4911
(1982)), the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 335, 89 Stat.
930 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6305 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988)), the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 2, 90 Stat. 2825 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No.
403
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cause the Court's narrow holding leaves many questions un-
resolved, the lower courts undoubtedly will continue to disagree on
the requirements for standing and subject matter jurisdiction.
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act grants a right of action to
any citizen, defined as "a person or persons having an interest which
is or may be adversely affected,"15 to commence a civil action in fed-
eral district court "against any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of [either] (A) an effluent standard or limitation . . . or (B)
an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such
a standard or limitation ".... 6 It states that neither the amount in
controversy nor lack of diversity of citizenship among the parties
shall bar a United States district court from having jurisdiction over
a citizen suit.' The statute provides that no citizen suit may com-
mence until sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice to the Ad-
ministrator, to the state in which the violation occurs, and to the
alleged violator.' The citizen suit statute authorizes district courts
to order injunctive relief and civil penalties payable to the United
States Treasury.9 The statute does not create a cause of action for
damages,"0 but it does authorize the court to award costs of litiga-
tion to the substantially prevailing party. "
91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1706 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982)), the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No.
99-499, § 206, 100 Stat. 1703 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (Supp. IV 1986)), the Natu-
ral Gas Pipeline Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 520, 91 Stat. 503 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
App. § 1686 (1982)), and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 96-129,
§ 215, 93 Stat. 1014 (codified at 49 U.S.C. App. § 2014 (1982)).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 13 6 5(g) (1982).
6. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). The statute also authorizes
citizen suits "against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Adminis-
trator to perform any act or duty under [the Clean Water Act] which is not discretionary
with the Administrator." Id. at (a)(2).
7. Id. at (a). It is curious to note that the citizen suit provision may not even require
plaintiffs to have United States citizenship. The Clean Water Act defines "citizen" as "a
person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(g) (1982). "The term 'person' means an individual, corporation, partnership,
association, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any
interstate body." Id. § 1362(5).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(i)(A) (1982). In actions brought against the Administrator,
citizen-plaintiffs need notify only the Administrator. Id. at (b)(2). Actions in response to
violations of either the toxic pollutant standards or new source performance standards
may commence immediately after notification. Id. at (b).
9. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 379
(1987).
10. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I,
18 (1981) (holding that the Clean Water Act does not create an implied cause of action
for damages).
1I. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(d) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
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Resolving a three-way split among the circuits, the Court held
that the Clean Water Act does not allow citizen suits for wholly past
violations." In order to invoke district court jurisdiction, citizen-
plaintiffs must make a good faith allegation, based upon a reason-
able belief that is well grounded in fact, that at the time suit is filed
the defendant is in a state of either continuous or intermittent viola-
tion. 3 Further, an allegation of injury is sufficient to establish the
plaintiff's standing. 4 In order to succeed on the merits, citizen-
plaintiffs must prove that the defendant is in a state of continuous or
intermittent violation.' If the defendant fully complies prior to
judgment, under circumstances that make it absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to re-
cur, then the suit might be dismissed as moot.' 6
The Court's interpretation of the citizen suit statute does no
violence to the text, but it restricts the district courts' jurisdiction
over citizen suits more than the text demands and more than Con-
gress intended. Moreover, the Court failed to resolve what consti-
tutes a "wholly past" violation. Likewise, the extent to which a court
may impose civil penalties for past violations that are ongoing at the
time of the suit also remains unclear. These uncertainties in the
Court's holding make it likely that citizen suits will soon be before
the Court again.
I. THE CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hamker v. Diamond Sham-
rock Chemical Co.,17 was the first to consider whether past violations
could be the basis for a citizen suit. In January 1983 crude oil began
to leak from a Diamond Shamrock Chemcial Company (Diamond
Shamrock) pipeline into a creek which flowed through the Hamker
property.' During the two weeks that elapsed between detection of
the leak and its cessation, approximately 2400 barrels of crude oil
escaped into the creek.' 9 On December 1, 1983, the Hamkers filed
12. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 384-85.
13. Id. at 385.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 386.
16. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386.
17. 756 F.2d 392 (Sth Cir. 1985).
18. Id. at 394.
19. Id. The court viewed this incident as oil spilled on land, which dispersed and
entered the groundwater, subsequently reaching the stream. Through this reasoning,
the court was able to characterize the pollution of the stream as a discharge from a
nonpoint source (i.e, the land upon which the oil spilled), which would not be actiona-
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a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas alleging that Diamond
Shamrock negligently had operated and continued to negligently
operate the pipeline.2" The Hamkers sought an injunction requir-
ing Diamond Shamrock to take reasonable precautions to prevent
future violations of the Clean Water Act, civil penalties of $10,000
per day of violation, and an award of costs of litigation.2 ' The
Hamkers appended a tort claim for Diamond Shamrock's negligent
operation and maintenance of its pipeline and for its failure to
promptly and adequately clean up the spill. Pursuant to this claim,
the Hamkers sought $40,000 damages for injuries to aquatic life in
the stream, loss of use of the stream for watering livestock, and loss
of recreational, commercial, and aesthetic value of the property,
plus $120,000 punitive damages. The district court dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.22
In Hamker the Fifth Circuit held that the statutory language of
the Clean Water Act clearly did not allow citizen suits based on past
violations.2" The court found this plain meaning reinforced by the
ble. Id. at 397. The fact that the oil did not fall directly from the pipeline into the water,
but first spilled on land, is not an adequate basis to consider the leak and the pollution
of the stream as independent events. It must be viewed as one unlicensed discharge in
violation of the Clean Water Act. See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Defense
Dep't, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1283, 1294 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that defendant
could be held liable under the Clean Water Act for discharging pollutants into under-
ground waters provided that plaintiffs "establish that the groundwater is naturally con-
nected to surface waters that constitute 'navigable waters' under the Clean Water Act");
United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding
that "navigable waters" includes "normally dry arroyos through which water may flow,
where such water will ultimately end up in public waters .
20. 756 F.2d at 394.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 395. The Fifth Circuit focused its attention on the language "to be in viola-
tion" and found that this grammatical structure does not allow standing except when
there is an allegation of an ongoing violation. Id. The court cited as authority for this
position a passage from City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008,
1014 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 756 F.2d at 395. But the issue in
City of Evansville was whether § 505 created a cause of action for damages-the plaintiffs
sought neither civil penalties nor injunctive relief. The Hamker court noted that the
Supreme Court cited City of Evansville with approval in Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 18 n.28 (1981). 756 F.2d at 395.
The Middlesex Court invoked City of Evansville to support its conclusion that "both the
structure of the Acts and their legislative history [reveal Congress' intent] that private
remedies in addition to those expressly provided should not be implied." 453 U.S. at
18. The Court in Middlesex did not interpret the language "alleged to be in violation"
nor did it consider whether citizen-plaintiffs could have standing based on past
violations.
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structure of the statute. The states and the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) have primary enforcement
authority, and the citizen suit provision supplements the govern-
ment enforcement power by allowing citizens standing to enforce
the Clean Water Act when the state and the Administrator have
failed to take action.24 Section 505 clearly does not duplicate the
powers granted to the Administrator. 2- The court reasoned that, in
view of the statutory scheme distinguishing the powers of the Ad-
ministrator from those granted citizens, the Administrator's author-
ity to bring an action based on past violations does not imply that
section 505 grants that same power to citizens. 26 The court found
support for its interpretation in the sixty-day notice requirement to
the Administrator, the state enforcement authority, and the pol-
luter. The court determined that the notice requirement to the pol-
luter is most reasonably read as allowing the polluter sixty days to
cease polluting and thereby avoid suit, and that this notice provision
would be meaningless if citizen suits could be maintained for past
violations.2 7 The court also perceived a congressional intent to limit
the use of citizen suits so as to avoid unduly burdening the federal
courts. 28 The court restricted citizen suits to present violations in
order to prevent plaintiffs who ordinarily would litigate in state
24. 756 F.2d at 395.
25. Id. The most obvious difference between government enforcement and citizen
enforcement under the 1972 Clean Water Act is that the Administrator or a state might
seek criminal penalties against willful or negligent violators of the Act. 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1319(c) (West Supp. 1988). The 1987 amendments also gave the Administrator the
option to assess nonjudicial administrative penalties. Id. at (g).
26. 756 F.2d at 395. The court stated that it did not decide whether the Administra-
tor had the power to seek redress for past violations. Id.
27. Id. at 395-96.
28. Id. at 396. The court's principal support for this finding was a statement by Sen-
ator Hart, in which he said that the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act did not
provide for damages to the individual, and hence, potential financial gain would not
motivate persons to bring citizen suits. 116 CONG. REC. 33,104 (1970). Courts often
have considered the extensive legislative history of the Clean Air Act when interpreting
the citizen suit provisions of other acts. E.g., North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 515 F.
Supp. 961, 964 (D.D.C. 1981) (observing that Congress had identical reasons for enact-
ing the citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act), rev 'd on other grounds sub. nom. Village of Kaktovic v.
Watt, 689 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982). This is appropriate with respect to citizen suits
because the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision was "modeled on the provision
enacted in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970." H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 79, reprinted in ENvrL. PoL'v Div., CONG. RES. SERv., 2 A LEGiSLATvE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CoNrraoL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1482 (1973) [hereinafter
LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY]. But in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n. 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court interpreted Congress' intent as limiting citizen
suits by not allowing damages. Id. at 1I, 21. This is quite different from the Fifth Cir-
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court from bringing their suits into federal court by pendent
jurisdiction. 9
The Fourth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
favor of an approach which allowed the district courts broad juris-
diction over citizen suits in Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield.s0 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. (Gwaltney) owned a
meat packing plant alongside the Pagan River in Smithfield, Vir-
ginia. The Virginia State Water Control Board (the Board) issued a
permit under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(the NPDES) setting forth the conditions and limitations under
which the plant might discharge seven pollutants into the river.3
The permit required the plant to file monthly discharge monitoring
reports (DMRs) with the Board. These DMRs showed that the plant
had repeatedly violated its effluent limitations for five of the seven
pollutants covered by the permit.3 2 The Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion (the CBF) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (the
NRDC) brought a citizen suit against Gwaltney under section 505 of
the Clean Water Act to impose civil penalties for violations of the
permit limitations and to enjoin Gwaltney from future violations.3 3
cuit's interpretation that Congress sought to restrict citizen suits to ongoing violations
in order to reduce the burden on the federal courts. 756 F.2d at 396.
29. 756 F.2d at 396. For plaintiffs whose claims are primarily for damages. the in-
centive to file a citizen suit presumably comes from 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(d) (West Supp.
1988), allowing recovery of litigation costs. The court's concern is that plaintiffs whose
claims for damages ordinarily would be filed in state court would append their claims to
a citizen suit in hopes of obtaining an award of litigation costs even if their claim was not
meritorious. 756 F.2d at 396. This indeed appears to have been the case in Hamker.
30. 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
31. Id. at 379. The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (the NPDES),
established by 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988), is the principal regulation
controlling pollutant discharges. The Administrator of the EPA may issue permits al-
lowing discharge of pollutants under conditions designed to assure compliance with the
Act. Id. at (a). The individual states may issue and enforce NPDES permits under state
permit programs approved by the Administrator. Id. at (b), (c). The Virginia State
Water Control Board (the Board), for example. administers a state permit program ap-
proved by the Administrator. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:12 (1987 & Supp.
1988). The Board issued an NPDES permit for the Gwaltney of Smithfield (Gwaltney)
meat packing plant in 1974, and reissued and modified the permit in 1979 and 1980,
respectively. The permit conditions included limitations on seven pollutants, as well as
monitoring and reporting requirements. 108 S. Ct. at 379.
32. 108 S. Ct. at 379. Between October 27, 1981, and August 30, 1984, Gwaltney
violated its total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN) (a measure of nitrogen in various chemical
forms) limitation 87 times, its chlorine limitation 34 times, and its fecal coliform limita-
tion 31 times. Id. Gwaltney also reported five violations of total suspended solids limi-
tations and three violations of oil and grease limitations. For a chronological listing of
these violations, see Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 611 F.
Supp. 1542, 1566 app. A (E.D. Va. 1985).
33. 108 S. Ct. at 379-80. See 33 U.S.C. § 13 6 5 (g) (1982). The Chesapeake Bay
408
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Gwaltney acquired the plant in 1981 and assumed the obliga-
tions of the NPDES permit issued to its predecessor in interest.3 4
Gwaltney installed new equipment in March 1982 to improve its
performance with respect to the pollutants chlorine and fecal
coliform, and in October 1983 to reduce its release of total Kjeldahl
nitrogen.3 5 In February 1984 CBF and NRDC notified the Adminis-
trator of the EPA, the Board, and Gwaltney, of their intention to file
a citizen suit against Gwaltney for those effluent limitation violations
occurring after Gwaltney assumed responsibility for the plant, and
on June 15, 1984, they filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia.36 Gwaltney moved for dismissal for want of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, asserting that it was not in violation because
its last recorded violation occurred several weeks before CBF and
NRDC filed their complaint, and that because it was not in violation
the citizen suit could not be maintained. 7
The Fourth Circuit declined to follow the Hamker holding that
the Clean Water Act does not permit citizen suits seeking civil pen-
Foundation (the CBF) and the National Resources Defense Council (the NRDC) are
nonprofit corporations dedicated to protecting natural resources. CBF is a regional en-
vironmental group with over 19,000 members residing in the Chesapeake Bay area, and
NRDC is a national environmental group with over 800 members residing in Virginia.
611 F. Supp. at 1544. The district court held that the plaintiffs' claims that their mem-
bers "recreate in, on, or near, and otherwise use or enjoy the Pagan River and the water
system of which it is a part [and so] have been, are being, and will be adversely affected"
were sufficient to establish standing under Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740
(1982) (holding an organizational plaintiff must show injury in fact to establish stand-
ing), as interpreted in Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing an organizational plaintiff can satisfy the actual injury requirement by providing a
concrete indication that one or more of its members would be adversely affected by
defendant's pollution). 611 F. Supp. at 1546-47.
34. 108 S. Ct. at 379. The Board originally issued the permit to ITT-Continental
Baking Co., who subsequently sold the plant to Smithfield Foods, Inc. Gwaltney, a sub-
sidiary of Smithfield Foods, Inc., assumed responsibility under the permit on October
27, 1981. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 791 F.2d 304, 306
(4th Cir. 1986), vacated 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
35. 108 S. Ct. at 379. Gwaltney reduced concentrations of fecal coliform bacteria by
manually adding chlorine to its waste water. Insufficient chlorine would allow fecal
coliform to exceed permit limits, but excess chlorine would cause the chlorine limit to be
exceeded. After Gwaltney installed automatic chlorination controls, its last reported
chlorine violation occurred in October 1982 and its last reported fecal coliform violation
occurred in February 1984. The last TKN violation occurred in May 1984. Id. At the
time suit was filed, however, it was not at all clear that Gwaltney's new and unproven
waste treatment system would succeed. 791 F.2d at 308 n.9.
36. 108 S. Ct. at 379-80.
37. Id. at 380. Gwaltney moved for dismissal after the district court had already
granted partial summary judgment against Gwaltney on its liability for violating the
Clean Water Act. Id.
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alties for past violations.3 8 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with
Hamker's use of Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association39 to argue that citizen suits could seek only pro-
spective relief.4 ° In Middlesex the Supreme Court held that neither
the saving clause nor the citizen suit provision, nor any other provi-
sion of the Clean Water Act, created an implied private cause of
action for damages.4 The Fourth Circuit held that citizen suits
could not be used to seek damages, and "[a]ny statements that
might be read as limiting the scope of citizen suits to prospective
relief were mere dicta."4 2
The Fourth Circuit found that the statutory language was am-
biguous and plausibly could be construed as encompassing past vio-
lations.4 3  Because the language is subject to alternative
interpretations, the "plain language" of the statute cannot be dis-
positive. The structure of the Clean Water Act supported allowing
citizen suits for past violations and any other interpretation "would
eliminate a significant deterrent to violations of the Act and severely
undercut the Act's ambitious purpose . . . . " The court noted that
Congress phrased virtually all enforcement provisions of the Clean
Water Act in the present tense.45 In particular, the language au-
thorizing the Administrator to pursue civil action uses the same "is
38. 791 F.2d at 312. The Fourth Circuit also suggested that Hamker was distinguish-
able because it was based on a single, nonrecurring incident that occurred almost one
year before the suit, "for which not even a good faith allegation of a possible continuing
violation could have been made . I..." d. The Fourth Circuit interpreted the Hamker
facts even more unfavorably to the plaintiffs than did the Fifth Circuit. See Hamker v.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1985). This was undoubt-
edly an effort by the Fourth Circuit to distinguish the facts of the two cases; apparently
both courts sought to extend their holdings to the broadest possible spectrum of fact
situations.
39. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
40. 791 F.2d at 312.
41. 453 U.S. at 11, 21.
42. 791 F.2d at 312. The Fourth Circuit likewise found the Fifth Circuit's and
Gwaltney's reliance on City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) (cited with approval in Middlesex, 453
U.S. at 18 n.28), misplaced, because City of Evansville also concerned the availability of
private damage actions under 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). 791 F.2d
at 312.n.14.
43. 791 F.2d at 309. "[Tihe language is ambiguous, in that it can be read to compre-
hend unlawful conduct that occurred only prior to the filing of a lawsuit as well as unlaw-
ful conduct that continues into the present." Id. "A plausible construction of the
language is that one is 'in violation' and continues to be 'in violation' by having 'vio-
lated.' In other words, the taint of a past violation is continuing." Id. (quoting Student
Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474,.1476 (D.NJ. 1985)).
44. 791 F.2d at 309.
45. Id. For example, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988) employs the
410 [VOL. 48:403
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in violation" language employed in the citizen suit provision.46 The
court reasoned that citizen suits for past violations must be allowed
because the EPA clearly has authority to bring civil actions for past
violations, and the statutory language authorizing citizen suits is the
same as that authorizing suits by the Administrator. The court rec-
ognized that the structure of the Clean Water Act distinguishes the
enforcement authority conferred on the Administrator with that
conferred on citizen plaintiffs through section 505, and that these
powers are not equal in all respects. 47 Because Congress placed
limitations on citizen suits, however, the court refused to infer any
jurisdictional limitation which Congress could have but did not cre-
ate.48 In addition, Congress did not limit the civil penalties avail-
able under section 505, expressly allowing courts to "apply any
appropriate civil penalties under [33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)]."149 Because
courts may issue fines for past violations in suits brought by the EPA
and the statute expressly allows the same civil penalties for citizen
suits, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that courts may assess the civil
fines requested in a citizen suit for past or present violations.5 0
Further, the legislative history, though not conclusive, actually
supported the position that past violations could be the basis of a
citizen suit."' No part of the legislative history states that relief can
be granted only when violations are ongoing. 2 In fact, Senator
present tense in providing for government enforcement of the Clean Water Act. 791
F.2d at 309.
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1982) authorizes the Administrator to commence a civil
action whenever a compliance order is authorized, which occurs "[wihenever . . .the
Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any condition or limitation ......
Id. at (a)(l).
47. 791 F.2d at 310. Remedies available to the Administrator but not to citizen-
plaintiffs include criminal penalties, compliance orders, and, under the 1987 amend-
ments, nonjudicial penalties. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
48. 791 F.2d at 310. In addition to the limits on relief, Congress' express limitations
on citizen suits include the 60-day notice provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(I)(A) (1982),
and no right of action when either the Administrator or the state commences and dili-
gently pursues an enforcement action. Id. at (b)(l)(B).
49. 791 F.2d at 310 (quoting 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988)).
50. 791 F.2d at 310 & n.l 1. The court acknowledged that the availability of penalties
for past violations is not a grant ofjurisdiction, but maintained that this demonstrates a
consistent legislative scheme allowing citizen suits for past violations.
51. Id. at 311.
52. The court found that the legislative history cited by Gwaltney as denying relief
consisted of statements referring to the abatement of ongoing violations, and did not
relate to the issue at bar. d. The court found these statements unpersuasive on the
issue of the availability of penalties for past violations. Also, the court gave little weight
to the legislative history of the Clean Air Act, because the addition of civil penalties to
the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act changed the nature of the relief avail-
able. Id. at n. 12. This change in the nature of citizen suits under the Clean Air Act can,
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Muskie explicitly stated that past violations can be the basis of a citi-
zen suit.
53
The Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to prohibit citizen suits
for past violations in order to avoid the risk of inundating the fed-
eral courts with plaintiffs seeking federal court jurisdiction for their
damage claims.54 The court acknowledged the legitimacy of the
concern, but found that it might be better controlled by careful ex-
ercise of the courts' discretion in granting pendent jurisdiction,
with some difficulty, be reconciled with the statements in the Clean Water Act legislative
history that § 505 "is modeled on the provision enacted in the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1970," H.R. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 28, at 1497, and that "[s]ection 505 closely follows the concepts
utilized in section 304 of the Clean Air Act," H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess
133, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 820. The question is to what
extent is § 505 of the Clean Water Act modeled on, and how closely does it follow the
concepts used in, § 304 of the Clean Air Act. Although these two citizen suit provisions
are more alike than unalike, it appears significant that the legislators did not describe
their practical effects as identical.
53. In his October 4, 1972, written summary of H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1465, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 32,768 (1972), Senator Muskie described
the workings of the 60-day notice provision:
This 60-day provision was not intended, however, to cut off the right of
action a citizen may have to violations that took place 60 days earlier but which
may not have been continuous. As in the original Senate bill, a citizen has a
right under section 505 to bring an action for an appropriate remedy in the
case of any person who is alleged to be, or to have been, in violation, whether
the violation be a continuous one, or an occasional or sporadic one.
I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 179; 118 CONG. REC. 33,700 (1972). Senator
Muskie described the enforcement power of both the Administrator and citizen-plaintiffs
in his speech to the Senate introducing the conference committee report for Senate
approval:
The Administrator's authority is not limited to those cases in which there is a
continuing violation. Any discharge, intermittent or continuous, which the Ad-
ministrator finds violates the terms of the permit, is to be enforced. The con-
ferees expect that the Administrator will act as aggressively against those
violations which only intermittently occur as he will act against those violations
which occur on a continuous basis. Failure to take this kind of effective action
will permit intermittent dumping of waste with impunity. Citizen suits can be
brought to enforce against both continuous and intermittent violations.
I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 63; 118 CONG. REC. 33,693 (1972). This state-
ment suggests that citizen-plaintiffs may bring suit in the same situations as may the
Administrator. Indeed, it draws no distinction between their respective abilities to bring
actions for wholly past violations.
54. 791 F.2d at 312-13. Plaintiffs appending their damage claims to citizen suits was
a significant concern in Hiamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 396
(5th Cir. 1985), and in Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089,
1091 (lst Cir. 1986), where the plaintiffs primarily sought damages. In contrast, the
plaintiffs CBF and NRDC sought the imposition of civil penalties as a deterrent to viola-
tors of the Clean Water Act and raised no damages claim. Hamker's answer to the prob-
lem is over-inclusive, as it denies jurisdiction to many claims that are not affected with
the evil the court purports to control.
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rather than by restricting the scope of citizen suits. 55
In Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.5 6 the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit adopted a position in between those of
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits." Pawtuxet Cove Marina filed a citi-
zen suit alleging that Ciba-Geigy had discharged pollutants in ex-
cess of levels allowed under its NPDES permit.58 Before the
plaintiffs filed the suit, Ciba-Geigy had begun sending its effluent to
a municipal treatment facility instead of discharging into the Paw-
tuxet River, and was no longer operating under its NPDES permit.5"
The district court dismissed the citizen suit for lack of jurisdiction
and the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal.6 °
The First Circuit found that the statutory language is not so
ambiguous that courts should construe it to encompass wholly past
violations. The difference between "is ...in violation" and "has
violated" is so conspicuous that Congress must have recognized it
and intended for the statute to address ongoing violations.6 ' Con-
gress consistently used the present tense, except in one instance in
which the incorporation by reference of one section of the Clean
Water Act into another produced what the court termed as "gram-
matical confusion."162 Moreover, the court found evidence of Con-
gress' intent that citizen suits should have prospective effect in the
fact that, with respect to alleged violations of permits, the statute
55. 791 F.2d at 313. Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties
to litigate claims not subject to federal court jurisdiction if the claims arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence as a claim subject to federal court jurisdiction. FED. R.
Civ. P. 13. The discretionary nature of pendent jurisdiction is settled law: "It has con-
sistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff's right." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
56. 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986).
57. Id. at 1092.
58. Id. at 1090-91. Pawtuxet Cove Marina (Marina) appended a claim for damages,
alleging that the presence of pollutants in the silt in Pawtuxet Cove prevented dredging
to improve access to Marina's property, causing economic injury and stress related ill-
ness. Id. at 1091. The court found no evidence that the dredging would have taken
place even if Ciba-Geigy's pollutants were not present in the silt. Id. The facts of the
case suggest that Marina's principal interest was in finding someone else to pay for the
dredging. Id.
59. d.
60. 807 F.2d at 1091.
61. Id. at 1092.
62. Id. Marina urged that an "effluent standard or limitation under this chapter" is
defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1365(0(1) (1982), as including any unlawful act under 33 U.S.C.
§ 131 l(a) (1982), which in turn expressly encompasses any past or present violation.
807 F.2d at 1092. The Marina argued that the statute thereby granted jurisdiction for
citizen suits for past violations. Id. The court dismissed this argument as based on
"grammatical confusion." Id.
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prohibits actions for past violations unless the "permit ... is in ef-
fect." 3 The court acknowledged Senator Muskie's statement in the
legislative history, relied on by the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney, but
disregarded it, noting that the remark could not create ambiguity in
an unambiguous statute. '
The First Circuit reasoned that the history of citizen suits sup-
ported the interpretation allowing suits only for present viola-
tions.65 The language "is . .. in violation" originally appeared in
the Clean Air Act, which only allowed injunctive relief and therefore
was relevant only to ongoing violations.66 The court interpreted the
inclusion of civil penalties in the citizen suit provision of the Clean
Water Act as not changing the purpose or nature of citizen suits, but
only as adding civil penalties to the injunctive relief.6 7 Congress
originally contemplated that some past violations would be immune
from citizen suits. 68 Consequently, because there was no change in
the purpose or nature of the citizen suit provision under the Clean
Water Act, citizen suits can be maintained only where injunctive re-
lief is sought for ongoing violations.69
The First Circuit also found serious problems with the Hamher
holding, or at least with one district court's interpretation of
Hamker.' ° Because a serious violation might last only a few minutes,
proof that a violation is occurring at the time of the suit may be an
63. 807 F.2d at 1093. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(0 (1982) defines for the purposes of citizen
suits the term "effluent standard or limitation." Moreover, it is broadly inclusive in na-
ture, and only in subsection (6) is there any language that might be interpreted in an
exclusive manner: "a permit or condition thereof.., which is in effect under [the Clean
Water Act]." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (1982). The court read this as excluding any actions
for permit violations where the permit is no longer in effect. 807 F.2d at 1093. While
this interpretation is not implausible, a less strained interpretation is possible. For ex-
ample, this language reasonably could be read as distinguishing permits and conditions
imposed under the authority of the Clean Water Act from any other waste-water permit
or condition.
64. 807 F.2d at 1093 n.3. For the text of Senator Muskie's statement, see supra note
53. The First Circuit recognized Senator Muskie's statement as expressing his belief
that 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988) allows citizen suits for wholly past
violations, and it recognized that its holding did not ease all of the Senator's apprehen-
sions. 807 F.2d at 1093 n.3.
65. 807 F.2d at 1092.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1982).
67. 807 F.2d at 1092.
68. Id. at 1093.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1094. The court referred specifically to Sierra Club v. Copolymer Rubber
& Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-16 (M.D. La. 1985) (suit dismissed after plain-
tiff failed to prove its allegation that defendant was in violation on the date that plaintiff
filed suit).
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overwhelming obstacle to citizen suits.7 t With the sixty-day notice
provision, even a persistent violator temporarily may cease violating
so as to eliminate subject matter jurisdiction under the Hamker deci-
sion.72 Because of these problems, the First Circuit focused on the
language "is alleged to be in violation," which it interpreted as re-
quiring only a good faith allegation of "a continuing likelihood that
the defendant, if not enjoined, will again proceed to violate the
[Clean Water] Act."7 -
The First Circuit gave the phrase "is alleged to be in violation"
the same practical construction which it would give the $10,000
damages requirement for federal court jurisdiction in a diversity
case. 74 The court held that citizen-plaintiffs must make a good faith
allegation that the defendant has a present continuing intent to vio-
late the Clean Water Act, and jurisdiction is not lost if it is proven
that there was no actual violation at the time of the suit. "If a de-
fendant's history of past violations is such that it is reasonable to
believe that misconduct will continue, not only is it reasonable to
allege a continuing violation, but this is precisely the showing that
would induce a court to issue an injunction."7 " The court expressly
stated that when this good faith allegation has been made, civil pen-
alties may be issued for past violations, even if the violation has
ceased and injunctive relief would not be appropriate.7 6
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on Gwaltney to resolve
the conflict between the circuit courts.77 In a unanimous decision,78
71. 807 F.2d at 1093.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1094.
74. Id. at 1093.
75. 807 F.2d at 1094. The court stated that a district court should consider, "among
other things, the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction, the degree of scienter on
the part of the defendant, and the sincerity of its assurances against future violations."
id. These are among the standards for issuing an injunction noted in SEC v. Bonastia,
614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980) (involving violations of federal securities laws). In
addition to the factors cited in Pawtuxel Cove, Bonastia included "defendant's recognition
of the wrongful nature of his conduct, the sincerity of his assurances against future viola-
tions, and the likelihood, because of defendant's professional occupation, that future
violations might occur." 614 F. Supp. at 912. All of these factors could be relevant with
regard to Clean Water Act violations as well.
76. 807 F.2d at 1094.
77. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 381
(1987). In addition to the First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, decisions of the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits have been cited as addressing this question. For example, in City of
Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh
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the Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Gwaltney
and remanded the case for reconsideration consistent with its hold-
ing, which follows much the same approach taken by the First Cir-
cuit in Pawtuxet Cove.
A. Availability of Civil Penalties for Wholly Past Violations
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the lan-
guage of the citizen suit statute was ambiguous, but disagreed with
that court's interpretation of the statute.7" The Court reasoned that
the most plausible interpretation of "alleged to be in violation" was
to require that the plaintiffs "allege a state of either continuous or
intermittent violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past
polluter will continue to pollute in the future."' 0 The Court found
that Congress' failure to use a grammatical construction that en-
compassed past violations could not be dismissed as inadvertent be-
cause the difference in language was both obvious and easily
remedied.8" For example, Congress' use of the past tense in other
environmental protection statutes demonstrates that Congress
could avoid the prospective implication if it chose to do so.8" Signif-
Circuit stated in dicta that 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988) "does not
provide for suits against parties alleged to have violated an effluent standard or limita-
tion in the past or for recovery of damages." Id. at 1014. In United States v. Earth
Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979), the Tenth Circuit said, without reference
to citizen suits, that the EPA may bring civil actions for past violations, regardless of
whether an action has commenced for injunctive relief. Id. at 375-76.
78. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Rehnquist, and White joined Justice Marshall's
Opinion of the Court. 108 S. Ct. at 378. Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens joined
Justice Scalia in his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id. at
386. Justice Powell's seat was vacant when the Court decided Gwaltney.
79. Id. at 38 1.
80. Id.
81. Id. The Court rejected CBF and NRDC's argument that Congress' use of the
present tense was a "careless accident." Id. But use of the present tense might be better
characterized as an institutional custom than as a careless accident. It is a basic rule of
bill drafting that bills should always be drafted in the present tense. 2A N. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.10 (4th ed. 1986).
82. 108 S. Ct. at 381 & n.2. The Court cited the citizen suit provision of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, which allows citizen suits against:
any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present
owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contrib-
uted or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The pre-1984 version of § 6972(a)
was substantively identical to the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (1982). Likewise, the 1984 amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, known
as the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, added the above-referenced language
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icantly, other citizen suit statutes, which have been interpreted as
authorizing only prospective relief, employ language identical to
that used in the Clean Water Act.8 3
Further, the Court rejected the argument that parallel construc-
tion permits citizen suits whenever the Administrator could seek
civil enforcement.8 4 The Administrator clearly may seek civil penal-
ties for past violations.8 5 CBF and NRDC argued that citizen-plain-
tiffs can bring civil actions in the same circumstances as might the
Administrator because the language "is in violation" is used in both
section 505, authorizing citizen suits, and section 309(b), authoriz-
ing civil enforcement actions by the Administrator. 6 The Court
disagreed, noting that section 309(b) only authorizes the Adminis-
trator to seek equitable relief, which inherently is prospective in ef-
fect.8" The Court concluded that for the language "is in violation"
while leaving intact the original language allowing citizens to bring suits against any
person "alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, re-
quirement, [prohibition,] or order .... " 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
(the 1984 amendments added "prohibition").
Further, the Court also cited the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act as evi-
dence of Congress' ability to avoid the prospective implication. The 1987 amendments
gave the Administrator and the Secretary of the Army the authority to assess administra-
tive penalties whenever either "finds that any person has violated" relevant provisions of
the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(g)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
83. 108 S. Ct. at 381. In addition to the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12(a),
84 Stat. 1706 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982)), the Court cited the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 2, 90 Stat. 2825 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), and the Toxic Substances
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 20, 90 Stat. 2041 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2619 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), as examples of citizen suit provisions authorizing only
prospective relief. Id. But note that the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act authorize civil penalties in citizen suits and clearly allow imposi-
tion of penalties for past actions which contributed to a present endangerment to health
or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
84. 108 S. Ct. at 381-82.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 382. CBF and NRDC contended that § 309(b) authorizes the Administra-
tor to seek civil penalties as well as injunctive relief, and § 309(d) merely determines the
nature of such penalties. Id. "The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil ac-
tion for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction for any viola-
tion for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a) of this
section." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982). Subsection (a), in turn, authorizes action when-
ever "the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any condition or limita-
tion .... ." id. at (a)(l). CBF and NRDC argued that because the Administrator has
authority to seek civil penalties for past violations, and because the authorizing language
uses the same "is in violation" phrase used in the citizen suit provision, citizen suits may
also seek penalties for past violations. 108 S. Ct. at 382.
87. 108 S. Ct. at 382. The Court cited Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1839
(1987) (holding that section 309(b) and section 309(d) create independent grants of
enforcement authority).
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used in section 309(b) and section 505 to be given parallel construc-
tion, it must consistently relate to prospective relief.88 In contrast,
section 309(d) authorizes the Administrator to seek civil penalties
against "[a]ny person who violates" relevant provisions of the Clean
Water Act, a choice of language more easily read to encompass past
violations. Therefore, the Court held that citizen suits, unlike gov-
ernment enforcement actions, may seek only civil penalties where
injunctive relief could be considered.
Looking at the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provisions as a
whole, the Court found that the pervasive use of the present tense
gives section 505 a distinctly prospective orientation." According
to the Court, any interpretation which would allow citizen suits for
wholly past violations would render the sixty-day notice provision
incomprehensible."0 The Court reasoned that because the purpose
of requiring notice to the EPA and the state is to allow either entity
to initiate an action and thereby bar the citizen suit, then likewise
88. 108 S. Ct. at 382.
89. id. According to the Court,
[a] citizen suit may be brought only for violation of a permit limitation "which
is in effect" under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(0. Citizen-plaintiffs must give
notice to the alleged violator, the Administrator of EPA, and the State in which
the alleged violation "occurs." § 1365(b)(l)(A). A Governor of a State may
sue as a citizen when the Administrator fails to enforce an effluent limitation
"the violation of which is occurring in another State and is causing an adverse
effect on the public health or welfare in his State." § 1365(h). The most telling
use of the present tense is in the definition of "citizen" as "a person... having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected" by the defendant's violations
of the Act. § 1365(g).
Id. What the Court regards as the "most telling use" of the present tense is in fact its
weakest argument. A wholly past violation of the Clean Water Act is very likely to cause
future harms. It is the pollution itself, rather than the event of pollutant discharge, that
adversely affects citizen-plaintiffs.
90. 108 S. Ct. at 382. Section 505(b) prohibits commencement of citizen suits prior
to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation to the Administra-
tor, to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and to any alleged violator. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(A) (1982). Suit may commence immediately when there is an al-
leged violation of either 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1982) (national standards of performance-
the new source performance standards) or 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317 (West 1986 & Supp.
1988) (toxic and pretreatment effluent standards). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982). Only
the Administrator need be given notice of actions against the Administrator. id. at
(b)(2).
If the Administrator or state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or
criminal action in a court of the United States (or, under the 1987 amendments to the
Clean Water Act, an administrative enforcement action), citizen suits are prohibited. Id.
at (b)(l)(B). The structure of the Clean Water Act places this prohibition within the
notice provision of § 1365(b), clearly connecting it with the 60-day notice provision. See
id. at (b)(l)(A). By virtue of this structural arrangement, it is clear that Congress in-
tended these provisions to allow the Administrator or the state 60 days in which to com-
mence a civil or criminal action and thereby preempt the citizen suit.
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the purpose of notifying the alleged violator must be to allow the
violator to come into compliance and thereby bar the citizen suit.9
This reasoning is not compelling, nor is it supported by the legisla-
tive history.9 2 The Court also found that allowing citizen suits for
past violations would undermine the primacy of governmental en-
forcement, and expand citizen suits beyond the supplementary role
intended by Congress.9" This argument carries no weight at all.
Certainly, Congress intended government enforcement to remedy
most violations, and anticipated that citizen suits would arise in the
rare instances when government enforcement might fall short. But
it is diabolical to argue that inadequacies in governmental enforce-
ment must bar citizen suits lest they become the dominant mode of
91. 108 S. Ct. at 382-83.
92. The Court incorrectly asserts that the notice requirement to the violator be-
comes gratuitous if the purpose of the 60-day notice is other than to allow the violator to
avoid a citizen suit by coming into compliance. Id. at 383. Notice of a pending suit
encourages prompt compliance which furthers Congress' goal "that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1)
(West 1986 & Supp. 1988). The incentive for prompt compliance is the violator's ability
to limit its liability and avoid an additional 60 days of fines up to $10,000 per day (and,
under the 1987 amendments, up to $25,000 per day).
The legislative history clearly explains the purpose of the notice requirement:
In order to further encourage and provide for agency enforcement, the Committee
has added a requirement that prior to filing a petition with the court, a citizen
or group of citizens would first have to serve notice of intent to file such action
on the Federal and State water pollution control agency and the alleged pol-
luter .... The time between notice and filing of the action should give the administrative
enforcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged violation.
2 LEGIstATivE HISTORY, supra note 28, at 1497-98 (emphasis added). The Court's inter-
pretation also conflicts with earlier judicial interpretation. See Friends of the Earth v.
Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 175 (2d Cir. 1976) (notice requirement should be construed flexi-
bly to further its purpose of providing administrative agencies time to act rather than
hinder citizen participation).
The Court's interpretation creates, rather than avoids, inconsistency. If the pur-
pose of the notice provision were to allow the polluter the opportunity to come into
compliance and avoid penalty, then Congress probably would have made government
enforcement subject to the notice requirement as well. If its intent were to bar citizen
suits when the violator comes into compliance, then Congress easily could have made
this limitation part of 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988), just as it barred
citizen suits when the Administrator or state is taking action.
93. 108 S. Ct. at 383. Since 1982, the number of Clean Water Act citizen suits filed
against polluters increased significantly. This increase resulted from a perception
among environmental organizations, particularly NRDC, that the federal government
was not adequately enforcing pollution control laws. These organizations had previ-
ously devoted most of their efforts toward forcing the EPA to comply with its statutory
mandates rather than pursuing enforcement actions against individual polluters. Inter-
estingly, this increased emphasis on enforcement is actually a shift toward the original
purpose of citizen suits, rather than a shift away from it. J. MILLER & ENVTL. L. INST.,
CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAws 10-15
(1987) [hereinafterJ. MILLER].
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enforcement.
94
Lastly, the Court reasoned that the legislative history of the
Clean Water Act consistently characterized citizen suits as abate-
ment actions.9 5 Congress modeled the Clean Water Act citizen suit
provisions on those of the Clean Air Act, which provided only in-
junctive relief, and the legislative history suggests that Congress in-
tended that the two provisions be comparable despite the changes
introduced.9 6 The Court interpreted Senator Muskie's explanation
of the statute as allowing citizen suits against an intermittent pol-
luter even if there is no violation at the time of the suit, but found
no support for citizen suits for wholly past violations.97
The Court's decision clearly overturned the Fifth Circuit's in-
terpretation that section 505 allows only prospective relief; it also
rejected the interpretation of the Fourth Circuit to the extent that
wholly past violations cannot be grounds for a citizen suit. In so
holding, the Court has taken a cautious approach to construing the
statute. Given the equivocable language of the statute and the legis-
lative history, it is hard to fault the Court for avoiding either ex-
treme. The statute and its legislative history allow a myriad of
conflicting inferences, and the weight given to each inference is sub-
jective. Still, interpretation which allows citizen suits to seek civil
penalties for past violations is the stronger position.
94. Indeed, the very fact that Congress intended for citizen suits to fill a supplemen-
tary role supports allowing citizen suits for wholly past violations. If Congress intended
for citizen suits to provide alternative enforcement when the EPA has failed to act, then
it is apparent that the harms for which remedies are sought often will be the conse-
quences of past violations.
The Court suggested that citizen suits for past violations could thwart the EPA's
ability to make deals with the polluter because the polluter would remain vulnerable to
citizen suits. 108 S. Ct. at 383. This concern can be resolved easily without barring
citizen suits. If the EPA and the polluter reach a settlement with regard to certain viola-
tions, that settlement can become res judicata through a consent judgment, and the
incident no longer would be grounds for a citizen suit. See, e.g., Monsanto v. Ruckel-
shaus, 753 F.2d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that a consent decree is ajudgement)
and United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1517 (11th Cir. 1983) (same).
Citizen enforcement does not threaten to exclude the EPA from enforcement pro-
ceedings. The Administrator is entitled to intervene as a matter of right in any citizen
suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (1982). The 1987 amendments also assure that the Admin-
istrator and the Attorney General will receive 45 days' advance notice of a proposed
consent judgment in any citizen suit to which the United States is not a party. 33
U.S.C.A. § 136 5(c)(3) (West Supp. 1988). Moreover, a consent decree between a de-
fendant and a citizen-plaintiff may not bind the United States. See United States v. Atlas
Powder Co., 26 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
95. 108 S. Ct. at 383.
96. Id. at 383-84.
97. Id. at 384. For the text of Senator Muskie's statement, see supra note 53.
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The legislative history suggests that Congress generally
thought of citizen suits as a mode of injunctive relief. Although
Congress may have anticipated that citizen suits would in practice
seek predominantly injunctive relief, it does not necessarily follow
that it fashioned a statute to allow only prospective relief. 8 The
only direct authority was Senator Muskie's assertion that a citizen
might bring an action against any person alleged to have been in
violation. The Court found the probative value of Senator Muskie's
statement to be outweighed by the inferences drawn from state-
ments made with no thought to the issue at bar. It is difficult to see
how a dozen inconclusive statements might outweigh one direct
statement. This is particularly so when that single direct statement
was made by the principal author of the Clean Water Act in his sum-
mary of the conference committee report, and was not contempora-
neously contested.99 If Senator Muskie's statement were contrary to
the will of Congress, surely opposition would have appeared in the
legislative history.
Even if Senator Muskie's statement were not part of the legisla-
tive history, that history still would support citizen suits for wholly
past violations. In narrowly focusing its attention on the meaning of
"is in violation," the Court perhaps lost sight of the broader issue.
The Clean Water Act begins with a statement of Congress' goals
and policy, which declares as a national goal "that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.""I°° To
this end, Congress declared that "[plublic participation in the devel-
opment, revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, efflu-
ent limitation, plan, or program established by the Administrator or
any State under this [Act] shall be provided for, encouraged, and
98. "[I]f Congress has made a choice of language which fairly brings a given situa-
tion within a statute, it is unimportant that the particular application may or may not
have been contemplated by the legislators." Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90
(1945).
99. The Court has noted previously that a statement of one of the sponsors of legis-
lation "deserves to be accorded substantial weight in interpreting the statute." Federal
Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976).
When a bill is reported out of a standing committee, the member in charge of
the bill . . . explains its meaning to the house [and] answers questions concern-
ing the meaning of particular sections or phrases.... [These] statements may
be taken as the opinion of the committee about the meaning of the bill.
[This committee member's) remarks upon presenting the bill to the house and
... answers to questions asked by members ... are accorded the same weight as
formal committee reports.
2A N. SINGER, supra note 81, at § 48.14 (footnotes omitted).
100. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
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assisted by the Administrator and the States.'' ° Congress created
the citizen suit provision to allow citizens to enforce the Act as "pri-
vate attorneys general."' 2 Given Congress' undisputed intent to
eliminate water pollution and to encourage citizen enforcement, the
Court erred by inferring limits to citizen enforcement in the absence
of clear statutory limits.
B. Jurisdiction and Standing
The Court has never satisfactorily answered the question of
how to treat jurisdictional facts,' 3 and this decision by no means
puts the question to rest. The Court held that section 505 gives
district courts jurisdiction over citizen suits if plaintiffs make good
faith allegations of continuous or intermittent violations.'04 Ac-
cording to the Court, Congress intended that a good faith allega-
tion, rather than proof that the defendant is in violation at the time
of commencement of the suit, is sufficient to give the district court
subject matter jurisdiction.'0 5
Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court, asserting that the Court
misread section 505(a) to create "a peculiar new form of subject
matter jurisdiction, 1 °'0 6 in which lawsuits might go to judgment
without ever proving the jurisdictional allegations. He viewed the
majority decision as eliminating the defendant's opportunity to
contest subject matter jurisdiction by challenging the accuracy of
the jurisdictional facts alleged and as creating a new form of juris-
diction based on a good faith belief that the defendant's acts are
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1982) (emphasis added).
102. "The Committee realized that federal or state enforcement resources might be
insufficient, and that federal agencies themselves might sometimes be polluters; the citi-
zen suit provision created 'private attorneys general' to aid in enforcement." National
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1337 (ist Cir. 1973). With respect
to the citizen suits under the Clean Air Act, Senator Muskie observed that "it is too
much to presume that, however well staffed or well intentioned these enforcement agen-
cies, they will be able to monitor the potential violations (of all Clean Air Act require-
ments]." I ENVTL. POL'Y Div., CONG. RES. SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
AIR Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 280 (1974).
103. See Marshall, The "Facts" of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 35 DE PAUL L. REV.
23, 23 (1985).
104. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 384-85
(1987).
105. The Court adopted the reasoning of the Attorney General (as it did through
most of the opinion) and quoted the brief of the United States as amicus curiae. "Con-
gress's use of the phrase 'alleged to be in violation' reflects a conscious sensitivity to the
practical difficulties of detecting and proving chronic episodic violations of environmen-
tal standards." Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Gwaltney of Smith.
field v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 385 (1987) (No. 86-473).
106. 108 S. Ct. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgement).
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wrongful.'o 7
Justice Scalia interpreted section 505(a) as requiring only an al-
legation in order to commence a citizen suit in district court, but
requiring proof of the allegation in order to prevent dismissal of the
suit if subject matter jurisdiction is challenged.' 0 8 The prevailing
view of jurisdiction ordinarily does not require proof of the allega-
tion, 0 9 and Congress' choice of the language "alleged to be" sup-
ports the Court's holding that the allegation need not be proven for
a district court to accept jurisdiction over citizen suits.
Justice Scalia does not suggest a return to fact pleading, where
plaintiffs can be nonsuited for failure to allege sufficient facts. His
concurrence demands only that in the event a plaintiff fails to prove
an ongoing violation, the defendant may move for dismissal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. While the majority opinion does not
deny that suits could be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, it is clear that citizen-plaintiffs can avoid dismissal by showing a
good faith belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, that the allega-
tions are well grounded in fact.' "
The source of confusion lies in the fact that for citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act, the jurisdictional question and the mer-
its of the case are one and the same. Both sides may rest their cases
before the judge rules on subject matter jurisdiction, but Justice
Scalia exaggerated the Court's holding in suggesting that cases
107. Id. at 386-87. The Court clearly requires that citizen-plaintiffs prove their allega-
tions in order to prevail at trial on the merits. Id. at 386. Conceivably, the majority
intended that this requirement apply to the allegations of subject matter jurisdiction as
well, but the opinion of the Court does not say so. As a practical matter, proving the
ongoing or intermittent violation that gives rise to the right of action generally will
prove the subject matter jurisdiction allegations as well.
108. Id. at 387.
109. In St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938), the Court
reached an analogous decision regarding the amount in controversy requirement for
diversity jurisdiction, even though that requirement was not softened by the words "al-
leged to be." Id. at 290-92. In St. Paul the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana decided a diversity case rendering a judgment less than the amount
sought and less than the jurisdictional amount. Id. at 285. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit refused to reach the merits, holding that the district court should have
remanded the case to the state court. Id. On certiorari, the Court held that the district
court properly retained jurisdiction:
It must appear to be a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. The inability of plaintiff to recover an
amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or
oust the jurisdiction. Nor does the fact that the complaint discloses the exist-
ence of a valid defense to the claim.
Id. at 289 (footnotes omitted).
II0. 108 S. Ct. at 385.
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might be decided without plaintiffs proving their jurisdictional
allegations.
Justice Scalia also dissented from the Court's holding that only
an allegation of injury is necessary in order to establish standing."'
Justice Scalia contended that proof of an ongoing violation is neces-
sary to establish the plaintiff's standing." 2 The constitutional re-
quirement that the plaintiff suffer an injury in fact, remediable by
the court, is not eliminated by section 505. "' Justice Scalia argued
that a citizen-plaintiff suffers no injury in fact remediable by the
court unless the defendant is in violation at the time suit is filed.
Under his view, citizen-plaintiffs must be prepared to prove that the
defendant was in violation at the time suit was filed in order to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing to sue.
But should citizen-plaintiffs bringing enforcement actions
under a statutory right of action constitutionally be required to
prove that the violation causes them injury in fact redressable by the
court? Article III does not mention an injury in fact redressable
by the court; it is a judicial creation inferred from Article III's
limitation of federal court jurisdiction to certain "cases" and "con-
troversies."' " The cases and controversies clause serves two con-
stitutional purposes, both related to separation of powers, by
limiting federal court jurisdiction to adversarial disputes of the type
traditionally resolved by courts, and preventing court intrusion into
other branches' areas of authority." '5 In addition to the constitu-
tional limits on federal court jurisdiction, there are prudential lim-
its."6 Only so long as the injury in fact requirement serves either
I 1. Id. The Court relied upon its decision in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975):
For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the
trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the
complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining
party .... At the same time, it is within the trial court's power to allow or to
require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment of the complaint or by affidavits,
further particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's
standing.
Id. at 501.
112. 108 S. Ct. at 388.
113. The Clean Water Act's definition of a "citizen" as "a person or persons having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected" makes the injury in fact requirement
clear. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982). See also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16 (1981).
114. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
115. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968) (holding that taxpayers had standing
to sue the federal government in order to prevent expenditures prohibited by establish-
ment clause of the first amendment).
116. For a summary of the rules that the Court developed to deny review to cases
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separation of powers or valid prudential concerns should it exclude
citizen-plaintiffs from bringing enforcement actions.
Two doctrines, justiciability and standing, have evolved from
the cases and controversies clause."' A justiciability analysis looks
primarily to the issue of the case, while a standing analysis focuses
on the plaintiff, asking whether the plaintiff is a proper party to liti-
gate the issue. Justiciability questions the substantiality of the con-
troversy,' 1" the issue's ripeness for adjudication, and whether it is a
political question reserved to the other branches of government.
The constitutional requirements for standing are an actual or
threatened injury to the plaintiff, caused by the defendant, and
redressable by the court; prudential limits on standing prohibit fed-
eral courts from hearing cases asserting generalized grievances, the
rights of third parties, or an interest outside the zone of interests
protected by statute." 9 The Court developed these rules in the
context of cases where plaintiffs challenged, the constitutionality of
an agency's action 120 and where plaintiffs challenged agency actions
as unreasonable or ultra vires121
Enforcement actions brought by citizen-plaintiffs, however,
within its constitutional jurisdiction, see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
117. Flast, 392 U.S. at 94-95, 98-99. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrTTIONAL
LAw 67-69, 111-14 (2d ed. 1988).
118. The substantiality requirement allows courts to avoid advisory opinions, collu-
sive suits, and moot issues. L. TRIBE, supra note 117, at 68-69.
119. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs seeking to enjoin the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare from transferring government property to a religious
organization without financial payment, must allege a distinct and palpable injury
redressable by the court to establish standing).
120. See, e.g. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508-10 (1975) (finding residents of one
metropolitan area without standing to challenge constitutionality of adjoining town's
zoning ordinances); Flast, 392 U.S. at 94-95. See also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Schles-
inger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1974) (holding that
plaintiffs challenging constitutionality of members of Congress serving as armed forces
reserves must allege concrete injury rather than generalized interest of all citizens to
establish standing).
121. E.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973) (holding members of environmental group who
alleged injury to aesthetic interests had standing to challenge Interstate Commerce
Commission approval of freight rate increases); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
740-41 (1972) (holding environmental organization or its members must be among
those injured to establish standing to challenge a Forest Service decision); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (holding tenant farmers established standing to chal-
lenge decision of Secretary of Agriculture by alleging that Secretary's permitting tenant
farmers to assign benefits to landowners would cause irreparable injury); and Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970) (holding
plaintiff data processing organizations not regulated by Comptroller of the Currency
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should form a third and analytically distinct line of standing
cases.' 2 2 Citizen suits to enforce violations of the Clean Water Act
present particular violations of the law, not generalized grievances;
citizen-plaintiffs assert their own statutory right of action which is
plainly within the zone of interests protected by the statute, not the
rights or interests of third parties. The term "private attorney gen-
eral" has been used to describe plaintiffs in cases challenging
agency action, but such challenges are hardly representative of the
attorney general's activities. The term is most accurate when ap-
plied to citizen enforcement actions because it is the attorney gen-
eral's duty to enforce the law against private parties. Instead of
analyzing citizen enforcement actions in the same manner as tax-
payer suits' 23 or challenges to agency action 24 for standing pur-
poses, the Court should regard citizen-plaintiffs as if they were the
attorney general. Proof of injury in fact is not an issue when the
attorney general brings an. enforcement action against a polluter.
Similarly, there should be no requirement of injury in fact where
citizens, acting as private attorneys general, step into the govern-
ment's role as enforcer of pollution control laws.' 25
Although there should be no constitutional limitation on citizen
standing to enforce the Clean Water Act, there are legitimate pru-
dential concerns. For example, neither a collusive suit nor one
brought by a plaintiff with resources insufficient for the task would
further the purposes of the Clean Water Act. The relevant ques-
tions are whether there is a real dispute present and whether it is
raised by a party who will vigorously and effectively pursue enforce-
ment. This view is echoed by Professor Tushnet, who observed in
The New Law of Standing: A Plea For Abandonment 126 that "the Court
finds standing when it wishes to sustain a claim on the merits and
denies standing when the claim would be rejected were the merits
were aggrieved parties with standing to challenge Comptroller's decision permitting na-
tional banks to compete with plaintiffs).
122. Unlike enforcement actions, challenges to agency decisions brought under the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act or other statutes are not distinguished
easily from those cases cited supra note 121. In cases involving constitutional claims, the
courts typically hold plaintiffs to a higher standard. As the Court noted in Bender v.
Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986), "subject-matter jurisdiction as-
sumes a special importance when a constitutional question is presented." Id. at 54 1-42.
123. Flat, 392 U.S. 83.
124. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669; Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727; Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., 379 U.S. 150.
125. SeeJ. MILLER, supra note 93. at 19-25.
126. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663
(1977).
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reached," particularly when a decision on the merits would overturn
established precedent.12 7 Tushnet argues that standing should be a
bar only where candid assessment reveals the plaintiff's inability to
present the case adequately and a pragmatic factual evaluation dem-
onstrates that the parties are not sufficiently adverse.'12 Although
injury in fact may be persuasive evidence of a plaintiff's adversity, it
should not be regarded as a constitutional requirement in enforce-
ment actions.
The difference in approach between the Court's opinion and
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion is apparent in the instructions to
the court below on remand. The Court directed the lower court to
find whether the plaintiffs' complaint contained a good faith allega-
tion of an ongoing violation by the defendant.' 2 9 Justice Scalia
directed the lower court to determine Whether there was in fact an
ongoing violation by the defendant at the time suit was filed.' 30
Viewed from this perspective, it b'ecomes clear that the majority
opinion addresses only the threshold issue of what is necessary for a
plaintiff to commence a suit, and leaves for another day the thorny
questions associated with the merits of the case. The Court's opin-
ion gives little guidance as to what is proof of an ongoing violation
or under what circumstances civil penalties would be available for
violations that occurred prior to commencement of a citizen suit.
The difference between the Court's and Justice Scalia's views of
jurisdiction and standing also are apparent with respect to a defend-
ant's coming into compliance during the course of a suit. The Court
would divest citizen-plaintiffs of standing if, during the course of
trial, the defendant's coming into full compliance were to make the
suit moot. The Court emphasized that the burden of proving a case
moot is a heavy one, requiring it to be "absolutely clear that the alleg-
edly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to re-
cur." 13' In Justice Scalia's view, a defendant's coming into
compliance after suit was filed would not defeat subject matterjuris-
diction. He maintains that standing and subject matter jurisdiction
both must attach at the time suit is filed or not at all, and once they
attach they are never lost. Even if remedial actions were taken
127. Id. at 663-64.
128. Id. at 700.
129. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 386
(1987).
130. Id. at 388.
131. Id. at 386 (quoting United States v. Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203
(1968)) (emphasis added by the Court).
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before suit was filed but their success only became apparent during
trial, subject matter jurisdiction would still exist.' 3 1
C. Wholly Past Violations
For citizen-plaintiffs and dischargers alike, a question of great
interest is under what circumstances a court may impose civil penal-
ties. The Court explicitly refused to allow civil penalties for wholly
past violations, yet it never defined a wholly past violation.
Justice Scalia adopted a very broad interpretation of "in viola-
tion," similar to that expressed by the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia below.' 3 3 "When a company has violated an ef-
fluent standard or limitation, it remains, for purposes of § 505(a),
'in violation' of that standard or limitation so long as it has not put
in place remedial measures that clearly eliminate the cause of the
violation.""' 4 Justice Scalia found that "to be in violation" suggests
a state rather than an act. The Court also reached the same conclu-
sion: " 'to be in violation' is a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs al-
lege a state of either continuous or intermittent violation."' 3 5 The
Court's unstated definition of "in violation" might be as broad as
that of Justice Scalia and the district court.
The broad interpretation of "in violation" neatly resolves many
of the questions addressed in these cases. First, it eliminates some
132. Id. at 387. "Subject matter jurisdiction 'depends on the state of things at the
time of the action brought'; if it existed when the suit was brought, 'subsequent events'
cannot 'oust[]' the court ofjurisdiction." Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring in the result, quoting
Mullen v. Torrance, 23 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824)).
By focusing his analysis of subject matter jurisdiction and standing on the state of
things at the time suit was filed, Justice Scalia appears to eliminate from consideration
the doctrine of mootness. It is unclear whether his interpretation of subject matterjuris-
diction simply made it unnecessary to invoke mootness to answer Gwaltney's concerns,
or whether he regards mootness as an aspect of subject matter jurisdiction. If the latter
interpretation reflects Justice Scalia's thinking, then this opinion hints at a unification of
some of the amorphous doctrines governing access to the courts.
133. "[A] polluter that exceeds various discharge limitations in its NPDES permit...
arguably remains 'in violation' with respect to those excesses, even though in subse-
quent years it brings itself into compliance." Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1547 (E.D. Va. 1985). The district court suggested
that this situation is analogous to that of a taxpayer who underpays in one year and
remains "in violation" of the relevant tax laws even though proper taxes were paid in
subsequent years. Id. The First Circuit noted that this analogy was "inapt" because the
taxpayer's violation is nonpayment, which continues until the obligation is met. Paw-
tuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1092 (1st Cir. 1986). That
court held that past effluent limitation violations that have ceased are not continuing
violations subject to citizen suits. Id. at 1094.
134. 108 S. Ct. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
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of the practical difficulties of detecting and proving chronic episodic
violations of environmental standards. Second, it reflects the nature
of the harms these standards are intended to prevent. For example,
the harm resulting from an illegal discharge of pollutants does not
cease once the discharger reduces pollutant discharges to within
prescribed limits. Aquatic organisms killed during a brief illegal dis-
charge are not restored to life by the discharger's return to compli-
ance, and even a temporary depletion of one species can
permanently alter an ecosystem. Pollutants may linger in a stream
bed for years, in a downstream bay for centuries, and in the oceans
forever. Regarding a violation as a state rather than an act is consis-
tent also with the regulatory schemes of the Clean Water Act and
the Clean Air Act. Because many of the pollution regulations re-
quire technology-based controls, it is appropriate to regard a viola-
tion as continuing until the discharger makes the necessary changes
in equipment or procedures. t3 6
But what line has the Court drawn between a "wholly past" vio-
lation for which civil penalties may not be imposed and an ongoing
"state of violation" for which they may? Suppose a defendant has
been continuously discharging a pollutant from some time in the
past and throughout the time suit is brought against it. It is clear
that a court may order an injunction and civil penalties for each day
from judgment until complete compliance. But may the court order
civil penalties for each day of violation beginning with the earliest
proven violation, beginning upon notice of the plaintiff's intent to
bring a citizen suit, or beginning on the date suit was filed? Under
Justice Scalia's broad view, penalties could be imposed from the ear-
liest proven violation.'7 Justice Scalia's concept of violation clearly
permits civil penalties for past violations, because he expressly rec-
ognized that a citizen suit could be maintained even when a defend-
ant has successfully remedied the problem prior to a plaintiff's
136. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988) (requiring application of
the "best practicable control technology," the "best available technology economically
achievable," and the "best conventional pollutant control technology" by various cate-
gories of dischargers); 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982) (requiring new fossil fuel-fired stationary
sources to apply the "best technological system of continuous emission reduction").
137. This is subject, of course, to the applicable statute of limitations. Jin the first case
interpreting the Supreme Court's Gwaltney decision, Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
834 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987), the court held that the federal five-year statute of limita-
tions, rather than California's three-year statute of limitations, applies to citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 1522-23. The court held that the statute was tolled 60
days before suit was filed, rather than upon notice of intent to sue or upon filing of the
suit, in order that the effect of the statute of limitations should be the same for actions by
citizen-plaintiffs as it is for actions by the EPA. Id. at 1524.
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filing, so long as that success was uncertain at the time suit was
filed.""s
Whether the majority opinion goes so far is unclear. The Court
tied civil penalties to injunctive relief, but did not hold expressly
that civil penalties could only be ordered for days of violation for
which injunctions could be ordered." 9 The Court's holding that
citizen-plaintiffs "may seek civil penalties only in a suit brought to
enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing violation" ' 40 is amenable to
interpretations allowing penalties for a past violation if the violation
is ongoing at the time suit is brought. Because a citizen-plaintiff
might seek a preliminary injunction when suit is filed or upon giving
notice of intent to sue, even the most restrictive interpretation of
the Court's opinion must allow imposition of civil penalties from the
time a preliminary injunction could be sought.
At the other extreme, consider a fact pattern such as that which
occurred in Pawtuxet Cove.' 4 ' There, the defendant had violated its
discharge permit, but had ceased discharging into the river entirely
before suit was filed, and was sending its waste to a municipal treat-
ment facility.' 42 Under any interpretation of the Court's Gwaltney
decision, such a case must be considered a wholly past violation and
not grounds for a citizen suit. But consider a situation in which a
discharger had violated an effluent limitation in the past, but be-
lieves that the violation will not recur even though no major steps
have been taken to prevent its recurrence.' 43 Under the state of vio-
lation approach, it would be a question of fact whether the remedial
measures were sufficient to bring the state of violation to an end. If
the state of violation is continuing, then suit may be maintained and
penalties conceivably ordered for the duration of that state of viola-
tion. While this authority to impose penalties could be abused, it
seems quite unlikely that federal trial judges would do so.
III. CONCLUSION
The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act may be read
138. 108 S. Ct. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
139. Id. at 382. "The citizen suit provision suggests a connection between injunctive
relief and civil penalties...." Id.
140. Id.
141. Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986).
See supra text accompanying notes 56-76.
142. 807 F.2d at 1091.
143. The Hamker case, where the plaintiffs alleged that Diamond Shamrock continued
to operate its pipeline negligently, illustrates this type of situation. See Hamker v. Dia-
mond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 394 (5th Cir. 1985).
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as either allowing or disallowing imposition of civil penalties for
past violations. Certain passages suggest that Congress may have
invested verb tenses with temporal significance, but careful review.
reveals so many inconsistencies that it becomes apparent that this
was not the case. The legislative history is of little help, principally
revealing that Congress as a whole gave no thought to the issues
raised in Gwaltney. Because the ambitious goals of the Clean Water
Act support broad interpretations of its enforcement provisions,
and because uncontroverted statements by the Act's principal au-
thor indicate that citizen suits might be brought for past violations,
the Court's rejection of the Fourth Circuit's decision unduly limits
citizen suits.
The Court held that only an allegation of an ongoing or inter-
mittent violation is necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction,
and only an allegation of an injury is necessary to establish stand-
ing.' 44 Plaintiffs ordinarily are not required to prove their allega-
tions in order to invoke a court's jurisdiction, and Congress' choice
of the language "alleged to be" supports this view of district court
jurisdiction over citizen suits. Justice Scalia disagreed with the
Court, asserting that the Court misread section 505(a) to create "a
peculiar new form of subject matter jurisdiction,"' 4 5 based on a
good faith belief that the defendant's acts are wrongful.' 46 Justice
Scalia also asserted that unless the defendant is in violation at the
time suit is filed, a citizen-plaintiff suffers no injury in fact remedia-
ble by the court and therefore fails to attain constitutional stand-
ing.' 47 Where the Court requires only that there be a reasonable
basis for a good faith allegation of a continuing violation, Justice
Scalia would require that the allegation also be true.
The majority's reluctance to adopt Justice Scalia's interpreta-
tion stems perhaps from a recognition of how close that view comes
to gutting the citizen suit provision. A definition of "violation" nar-
rower than that suggested by Justice Scalia, coupled with the re-
quirement of proof of violation at the time suit is filed, virtually
would eliminate citizen suits.' 48 For example, in Gwaltney the plain-
144. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 385
(1987).
145. Id. at 386.
146. Id. at 387. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
147. Id. at 388.
148. This was Gwaltney's argument exactly: "Here, respondents stipulated that [the
facts supporting the allegations necessary to sustain jurisdiction] are that Gwaltney
ceased violating its permit a full month before suit was filed. Any allegation that
Gwaltney was in violation at that time cannot sustain jurisdiction, since 'the facts as they
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tiffs stipulated that Gwaltney's last permit violation occurred before
the plaintiffs filed suit, "I although the plaintiffs maintained that this
was not determinable at the time suit was filed.' 50 Despite Justice
Scalia's statement that "[i]t does not suffice to defeat subject matter
jurisdiction that the success of the attempted remedies becomes
clear months or even weeks after the suit is filed,"'' it is foresee-
able that some courts might weigh such a stipulation heavily when
deciding whether a defendant was in violation at the time suit was
filed. 152
It is curious that the Court neither approved nor disapproved
of Pawtuxel Cove.15 3 Although the Court's rejection of the positions
of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits appears to be the same as that of the
First Circuit, there are differences between their respective hold-
ings. The First Circuit focused more upon the defendant's intent to
continue that course of action which resulted in past violations than
upon whether the plaintiff's allegations were made in good faith.' 54
The Supreme Court took the defendant's intent into account, 1 55 but
its opinion placed much more emphasis upon whether a citizen-
plaintiff had made a good faith allegation, based upon a reasonable
belief that was well grounded in fact, that at the time suit is filed the
defendant was in a state of either continuous or intermittent viola-
exist' conclusively prove otherwise." Brief for Petitioner at 39, Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987) (No. 86-473) (quoting Land v. Dol-
lar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947)).
Justice Scalia's requirement of proof could be reconciled with the difficulties in
proving violations of the Clean Water Act if the standard of proof for jurisdictional pur-
poses could be less severe than that required for prevailing upon the merits. Such a
scheme, however, seems no better than that which it would replace.
149. 108 S. Ct. at 379-80.
150. "Although, as it turned out, active violations had ceased a month before suit was
filed, there was then good cause to fear that excessive discharges would continue in the
future if petitioner were not restrained by injunction or deterred by an assessment of
penalties." Brief for Respondent at 26, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987) (No. 86-473).
151. 108 S. Ct. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
152. A second possible explanation for the majority's reluctance to adopt Justice
Scalia's interpretation is that the Court gave substantial weight to the interpretation of
the Attorney General. The interpretation adopted by the Court is in large part the same
as that argued by the United States as amicus curiae. Id. at 385.
153. 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986). See supra text accompanying notes 56-76.
154. Id. at 1093-94.
155. The Court held that the most natural interpretation of the statute is to require "a
reasonable likelihood that a past polluter [would] continue to pollute" should the court
deny the enforcement action. 108 S. Ct. at 381. The defendant's intent may also be at
issue when deciding if a case is moot, as the defendant must demonstrate that it is abso-
lutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior reasonably could not be expected to
recur. Id. at 386.
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tion. "6 The First Circuit Pawtuxent Cove decision explicitly acknowl-
edged that courts may issue penalties in situations where injunctive
relief is unobtainable, provided that the plaintiff made good faith
allegations warranting injunctive relief,'" 7 unlike the Court's
Gwaltney opinion which did not address this question directly.
Because the opinion of the Court did not resolve the questions
concerning what is a wholly past violation and to what extent civil
penalties may issue for past violations, the Court is destined to see
these issues raised again."' The most prudent interpretation of a
wholly past violation would be one which meets the Court's require-
ment for mooting an ongoing case: that it be "absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to re-
156. See part III of the Court's opinion, id. at 384-86.
157. 807 F.2d at 1094.
158. The uncertainty in the Court's decision is apparent in the subsequent decisions
of lower courts. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
district court's determination that the allegations of continuing violation were made in
good faith, and remanded to the district court to decide whether the plaintiffs proved an
ongoing violation. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 844 F.2d
170, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988). The district court held that the evidence demonstrated that
there was a likelihood of continuing violations at the time the plaintiffs filed suit, even
though Gwaltney subsequently came into compliance. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, 688 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1988).
In Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988), the Fourth
Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision allowed penalties for past violations de-
spite defendant's coming into compliance with permit requirements during the course
of the trial. In Simkins the plaintiffs brought a citizen suit alleging the defendant's failure
to file discharge monitoring reports and failure to perform required monitoring. The
defendant began monitoring and reporting after receiving the plaintiffs' notification of
intent to sue and before the plaintiffs filed suit, but the court held that there was an
ongoing reporting violation at the time suit was filed because the defendant's DMRs did
not contain accurate quarterly averages owing to its failure to test at the beginning of
the quarter. Id. at 1114-15.
In contrast, the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama interpreted the
Supreme Court's requirement of an ongoing violation as mooting a citizen suit at any
point. In Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, 682 F. Supp. 1186, 1190-91
(N.D. Ala. 1988), the court held that the Supreme Court's decision required it to issue a
stay until the defendant's new waste water treatment facility becomes fully operational,
in anticipation that the permit violations would then end and render the plaintiff's case
moot.
In Public Interest Research Group v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.J.
1988), the court rejected the defendant's argument that the Supreme Court's decision
only permits citizen-plaintiffs to seek penalties for violations occurring after the filing of
the complaint. The court held that the Supreme Court's instructions to the lower courts
on remand would be "nonsensical" unless penalties could be imposed for violations
occurring prior to filing the complaint. Id. at 118-19. The court held that citizen-plain-
tiffs may seek penalties for violations of an expired permit only when the present permit
imposes the same conditions. Id. at 119-22.
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cur."' 5 9 By holding that citizen-plaintiffs "may seek civil penalties
only in a suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing viola-
tion, '"  the Court appears to allow penalties for past violations
provided that the violation is ongoing at the time suit is brought.
The most restrictive interpretation of the Court's holding would al-
low penalties for violations dating from the plaintiff's notice of in-
tent to sue.
Gwaltney reduces the scope, and therefore the deterrent effect,
of citizen suits from the broad scope found by the Fourth Circuit.
While the Court has not directly restricted access to the courts by
restricting standing, it has held that wholly past violations are not
within the scope of Congress' jurisdictional grant. Citizen-plaintiffs
inevitably will be seeking to enforce past violations because only the
most egregious violations of the Clean Water Act are immediately
apparent. Owing to the uncertainty in the Court's decision, lower
courts will continue to allow or disallow standing inconsistently.
ScoTt B. GARRISON
159. 108 S. Ct. at 386 (emphasis in original).
160. Id. at 382.
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